‘Steps’ to Agency: Gregory Bateson, Perception, and Biosemantics

Abstract

Gregory Bateson was welcomed into Biosemiotics as one of its precursors along with C. S. Peirce and Jacob von Uexkull He certainly endorsed Peirce pragmatic concern with learning as an essential characteristic of mammalian life, and also endorsed von Uexkull’s notion that the fundamental unit of animate existence is organism plus econiche. But he was at odds both with the subjectivism and with the cognitivism that connects Peirce to von Uexkull. Bateson rests his case on information theory which, he believes replaces many metaphysical notions that were the background to Peirce and von Uexkull’s approaches to ‘meaning.’ His idea of cybernetic ‘feedback’ in information circuits or networks yields a new understanding of recursiveness. Yet biofeedback in mammalian interaction had to be wrestled away from technical cybernetics and its thermodynamic rules about information, for the latter payed no attention to ‘meaning’ (“Bioentropy” section). Of the contrasts between Peirce and Bateson, the most significant is that Bateson regards ‘difference’ as primary to perception, while Peirce is concerned with continuity as primary from perception to cognition. This contrast is at the heart of Bateson’s Korzybski Lecture (see “On the Title of ‘Steps’” section), and shows how ‘difference’ in Learning develops orders and levels (see “Memory and Learning” section) leading to different categories of learning. With regard to perception, Bateson argues that the processes of perception do not bind perception to conscious awareness in any exclusive sense. Further, patterns of perception are not bounded by the skin for they include all external pathways along which information can travel. This recursive activity develops ‘agency’ (“Perception and Consciousness” section). We are ourselves interact with living mental ‘things’ but interactions with animate ‘creatura,’ is not the same as the objective interactions we purse in measuring inanimate material ‘things’ (pleroma) (“How Bioentropy Informs Bateson’s Notions of Pleroma and Creatura ” section). The grasping of context in communicative interaction, for example, is unique to creatura (“Context in Recursive Communication” section). Recognition of ‘difference’ occurs through communicative interactions and is meta-physical (without dimension). The pattern of interaction is the ‘thing,’ and ostensive aspects of communication are contextual, inclusive of all ‘external’ aspects vital for interpretation of ‘signals’ between initiators and responders to messages. Towards the end of his life, Bateson’s concerns with non-human conditions of ‘meaning’ and ‘mind’ in nature, resulted in his dropping several of the Peirce’s conditions of semiosis, as he looks at ‘meaning’ without language. He rests his method the propositional order of Peirce’s abduction rather than the latter’s full array of abduction, induction and deduction. Bateson is supported by the Biosemantics of Ruth Millikan, this paper will argue, who also believes that the derivation of meaning in animals through natural signs requires the stripping away of any ‘meaning rationalism’ (“Meaning Rationalism” section). Together they provide joint conclusions about as sign use in the ecosystems of creatura (“Conclusion” section).