Abstract
Cyber-physical attacks exploit intrinsic natures of physical systems and can severely damage cyber-physical systems (CPSs) without being detected by the conventional anomaly detector. In this article, based on software-defined networking, we propose a holistic resilient CPS framework that can detect, isolate, and recover from cyber-physical attacks in real time. To show the effectiveness of the proposed framework, we focus on the pole-dynamics attack (PDA), a newly reported stealthy sensor attack that can make the physical system unstable. We develop an efficient detection algorithm for PDA and embed it into the proposed framework. By implementing a testbed, we validate that the proposed framework guarantees resilience of CPS against the PDA.
Highlights
C YBER-PHYSICAL systems (CPSs) are tightly integrated networked control systems, in which physical systems in the real world and control software in the cyber space are connected through networks [1]–[4]
We have proposed a cyber-physical security framework from the networking perspective, which guarantees the resilience of CPS against the pole-dynamics attack (PDA), a newly reported stealthy sensor attack
Our empirical results have shown that the proposed framework can ensure the resilience of a CPS against the PDA in real time
Summary
C YBER-PHYSICAL systems (CPSs) are tightly integrated networked control systems, in which physical systems in the real world and control software in the cyber space are connected through networks [1]–[4]. The PDA is the most recently reported stealthy sensor attack, for which detection and mitigation methods have not been fully addressed. We propose a cyber-physical security framework against the PDA, which can detect, isolate, and recover from the attack in real time. After PDA detection, we implement the following two consecutive network recovery processes; attacker isolation from the network and feedback loop reconstruction between physical and computing systems. To this end, we adopt software-defined networking (SDN) technology. 1) We propose a real-time resilient CPS framework against the PDA. KIM et al.: STEALTHY SENSOR ATTACK DETECTION AND REAL-TIME PERFORMANCE RECOVERY FOR RESILIENT CPS
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Free) 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a call
