Abstract
This note analyzes the effect from group sizes (i.e., the number of consumers) on steady-state stocks in the model of dynamic voluntary provisions of public goods. The model follows Itaya and Shimomura [4]. We focus on feedback Nash equilibrium strategies and find that (1) it is possible to clarify the condition such that the steady-state stock decreases as the group size is larger when consumers take linear feedback Nash equilibrium strategies and (2) when consumers take nonlinear ones, the set of possible steady-state stocks is enlarged as the group size is bigger.
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