Status Quo Bias in Ocean Marine Insurance and Implications for Korean Trade

Abstract

Purpose – This research uses ocean marine insurance (OMI) statistics, international emails, focusgroup interviews, and surveys to fill the gap between the theory of behavioral insurance, particularly status quo bias (SQB), and the practice of OMI in Korea. The contractual forms of OMI, the oldest and most globalized form of commercial insurance, were developed in the UK as the Institute Cargo Clauses in 1906 and revised in 1963, 1982, and 2009. SQB has been academically explored, mostly in health insurance and the financial services sector, but never in OMI. Thanks to the availability of OMI statistics in Korea, we can conduct SQB research here for the first time in this field. Design/methodology – We show the existence of SQB in the OMI of Korea through Korean statistics between 2009 and 2018, email correspondence with experts in the UK, Germany, and Japan, focusgroup interviews with Korean OMI underwriters, an in-depth interview with one underwriter, and a survey of 15 OMI insureds (company representatives). Findings – We find that Korean foreign traders rely on the old-type OMI contracts developed in 1963, whereas other industrialized countries use the newest type of OMI contract developed in 2009. With a simple loss ratio analysis during 2009–2018, we show that the behavior of insurers has little to do with rational profit maximization and is instead driven by irrational bias, as they forgo the more profitable contracts provided by the new clauses by keeping the old clauses. The consistent addiction to old types of contracts in the OMI market suggests strong SQB among Korean exporters, importers, bankers, or insurers, which we confirmed in our interviews and survey. Originality/value – This research has significant originality and academic value because it reports new findings with crucial implications for the development of efficient trade practices and policy. First, this research is based on actual statistics that have not been used in previous Korean research on OMI. Second, this research shows that all-risk OMI policies provide more value to insureds, in terms of coverage given premium, than partial coverage policies, which differs from arguments previously made in Korea. Third, this research reveals strong SQB in Korea, where foreign trade plays a pivotal role in economic growth. That bias could be attributable to uninformed traders, informed but idle insurers, or conservative bankers. Fourth, to further develop foreign trade, policy initiatives are needed to review the current practices of OMI contracts and move forward with the new contract forms. All of these findings and arguments are both new and important.