Status of Developing Afghan Governance and Lessons for Future Endeavors

Abstract

Building the capacity of and reforming Afghan governance is widely viewed as the key to success in Afghanistan. Assessing progress, however, is hampered by limited data outside the Afghan security ministries – the Ministries of Defense and Interior – and by the lack of a common definition of governance. Available reporting suggests building governance capacity is far from complete. Varying definitions of governance, coupled with the use of the term by numerous organizations without defining it, results in addressing too broad a range of issues. It would be more useful to concentrate on the core of governance – providing the services the Afghan government has committed to provide to its citizens. This, in turn, requires that Afghan ministries have the functional capacity to carry out their responsibilities, including financial management, budget formulation and execution, policy and strategic planning, and service delivery. However, time is growing short. The Afghan experience provides some important lessons that could guide future endeavors for the international community. First, this paper discusses progress in building ministerial capacity. Second, it discusses recent efforts to link continued financial assistance to Afghanistan with improved governance. Third, it describes how the lack of a commonly accepted definition of governance complicates assessing progress. Finally, it offers conclusions and observations about the failure to establish an autonomous Afghan governance capacity. For more than a decade, improving governance has been recognized as the most difficult and critical challenge involving Afghan reconstruction. The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) reports that U.S. policymakers have consistently identified building the capacity of and reforming Afghan governance as the key to success in Afghanistan (SIGAR 2012, 22).