Abstract
The law views with suspicion even highly reliable statistical evidence, but it has proved remarkably hard either to justify this suspicion, or to debunk it.In this paper, we connect the discussion of statistical evidence to broader epistemological discussions of similar phenomena. We highlight the epistemic requirement known as Sensitivity as a way of epistemically explaining the legal suspicion towards statistical evidence. But knowledge – and Sensitivity, and indeed epistemology in general – are of little, if any, legal value, we argue. So instead of relying on the epistemic story, we tell an incentive-based story vindicating the suspicion towards statistical evidence. And we show that the epistemological story and the incentive-based story are closely and interestingly related.
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