Abstract
This paper addresses a fundamental, yet unresolved, question: is statistical discrimination a market failure? I consider the problem for a utilitarian social planner who operates in an environment with imperfectly observable human capital investments. It is found that the informational problem that makes equilibrium discrimination between identical groups possible also creates efficiency gains from discrimination in terms of reduced mismatch between workers and jobs. Whether the solution to the planning problem involves discrimination depends on the trade-off between the informational gains of specialization and the losses in terms of increased investment costs.
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