Abstract
We examine the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) from the perspective of a principal-agent analysis. How much control did states exercise over the Court's prosecutor and what strategies did the prosecutor use to expand the Court's discretion? Although states generally delegate substantial discretion to international courts in order to maintain credibility, we find that states still exercised important influence over the SCSL by controlling resources vital to the Court's success. At the same time, the SCSL prosecutor implemented some strategies that enabled him to indict Charles Taylor against the wishes of the United States. The case suggests that states have figured out ways to achieve both credibility and influence, but that savvy international agents can have some success in circumventing the controls of state principals.
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