Statecraft and incremental change: Explaining the success of pension reforms in the United Kingdom

Thomais Massala,Nick Pearce

doi:10.1177/13691481211044655

Thomais Massala, Nick Pearce

Open Access

https://doi.org/10.1177/13691481211044655

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Abstract

How were comprehensive pension reforms in the UK successfully developed, enacted and implemented from 2002 to 2015, despite changes in government composition and the financial crisis? Why were they not subject to policy conflict, electoral competition and policy reversal? Drawing on actor-centred historical institutionalism and thirty interviews with key actors, we demonstrate the critical role played by a limited number of politicians and policy entrepreneurs and their ideas and agency. Institutional continuity with the Beveridgean policy legacies of the pension system and the United Kingdom’s `growth regime’ enabled a coalition space to open up for policy agreement. between the government and Opposition parties, and for partisan electoral competition over the reforms to be `bracketed’. The incremental and interlocking nature of the reform package reduced interest group opposition and enabled a centralisation of decision-making power. A long-term timeframe for reform cemented the formation of an elite coalition and buttressed political control. Cross-party support for the reform package, coupled with judicious phasing of the implementation of auto-enrolment and fiscal reforms, enabled it to withstand the impact of the financial crisis and the austerity that followed it, and to minimise opposition among the critical electoral constituency of older voters. The dominance of the reform process by political actors and policy entrepreneurs in the UK nonetheless came at a price, as institutional continuity and incrementalism foreclosed alternative reforms. We demonstrate the importance of political statecraft and policy entrepreneurship in the UK pensions’ reform process, but within boundaries set by its institutional context.

Highlights

Since the 1980s, pension systems in many Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries have undergone significant, often politically contentious reforms
We postulate that the United Kingdom’s pension reforms were consistent with this growth regime and the historical institutions of the welfare state, creating a space for cross-party consensus to emerge on the reform trajectory, and for electoral competition, in respect of powerful older voters, to be ‘bracketed’ by political actors
When we examine the temporality of the reform process – that is, the reform process over its whole duration or timeframe and the sequence of events therein – we can see the primacy of a key group of politicians and policy entrepreneurs within it

Summary

Introduction

Since the 1980s, pension systems in many Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries have undergone significant, often politically contentious reforms. We postulate that the United Kingdom’s pension reforms were consistent with this growth regime and the historical institutions of the welfare state, creating a space for cross-party consensus to emerge on the reform trajectory, and for electoral competition, in respect of powerful older voters, to be ‘bracketed’ by political actors. This enabled politicians and policy entrepreneurs to assume a central role in the development and implementation of the reforms. It enabled the Opposition to frame their engagement in a cross-party consensus as the practice of responsible politics

Methodology

Findings

Conclusion