Abstract
Scalogram analysis of nonunanimous criminal and economic liberties cases in 14 state supreme courts indicates that between 1971–1981 policy preferences structured voting behavior. Preference based voting declines after 1981—with the decline most noticeable in economic cases. This decline may be the result of preference complexity rather than a complete absence of preference based voting. Neither court duration, cases available for scaling, consensus nor three out of four institutional factors (electoral accountability, workload, docket control) explain preference based voting. A fourth institutional factor, opinion assignment procedures, is related to preference based voting— the “lottery” assignment method results in lower levels of preference based voting than an assignment procedure patterned after that used by the U.S. Supreme Court.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
