Abstract
‘Transformative liberals’ believe that the state should use its non-coercive capacities to counter hateful speech and practices, by seeking to transform the views of those who hold hateful and discriminatory beliefs. This paper critically assesses transformative liberalism, with a particular focus on the theory developed by Corey Brettschneider. For Brettschneider, the state should engage in ‘democratic persuasion’ by speaking out against views that are incompatible with the ideal of free and equal citizenship, and refusing to fund or subsidise civil society groups that hold such views. My critique has five parts. I first rebut two central justifications for transformative liberalism, regarding complicity and the undermining of equal citizenship. Second, I show that some of the central policies that Brettschneider advocates are in fact coercive. Third, I raise concerns about the nature of the complex and contestable judgments that transformative liberalism requires the state to make. Fourth, I argue that Brettschneider’s view has various troubling implications. Finally, I argue that many of these problems derive from his adoption of a thick conception of free and equal citizenship, resulting in an overly broad definition of hateful viewpoints and of hate speech. A defensible version of transformative liberalism would use a significantly narrower conception.
Highlights
Abstract ‘Transformative liberals’ believe that the state should use its non-coercive capacities to counter hateful speech and practices, by seeking to transform the views of those who hold hateful and discriminatory beliefs
Debates concerning hate speech and offensive speech typically focus on legal regulation: should such speech be made unlawful? Opponents claim that legal regulation constitutes an objectionable restriction of free speech, while proponents insist that hate speech imposes the
A crucial initial question for transformative liberals is what justifies democratic persuasion, so I first show that two putative justifications fail
Summary
A crucial initial question for transformative liberals is what justifies democratic persuasion, so I first show that two putative justifications fail. If there was such a perception the state could presumably remove this impression by pointing out the facts I have noted.11 Both the actual and perceived complicity claims appear implausible, with respect to both protections of liberal rights and state subsidy. A state that fails to enact transformative policies might be complicit with denials of FEC in this sense, even if it is not plausibly interpreted as endorsing these hateful viewpoints While true, this claim cannot be used to justify transformative liberalism, for two reasons. Even if it is true that groups that practice certain kinds of discrimination thereby express opposition to, or fail to respect, FEC, this is not the same as these practices undermining FEC Taking these distinctions seriously implies that Brettschneider’s justification for democratic persuasion often cannot be that the targeted individuals and groups are undermining equality of status. This is significant, because my arguments in later sections suggest that this duty is more limited than transformative liberals suppose
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