State Segmentation and Democratic Survival in Latin America

Matias López

doi:10.1177/0002764220941244

Abstract

Popular models portray that high inequality induces elites to sponsor coups and reverse democratization as a means for repressing redistributive demands. Challenging this prediction, Latin America shifted from a historical pattern of systematic democratic breakdowns to one characterized by the resilience of democracy despite extreme levels of inequality. This article argues that the reminiscence of state-led repression under democracy explains why elites more regularly waive coups as solutions to distributive conflict in Latin American democracies. I call this state segmentation, a concept that describes the asymmetries between the enforcement of citizenship rights for those in privileged positions and for the poor. Wherever state segmentation is high, the odds of democratic breakdown should be lower. I test the argument using logistic regression models to predict the probability of coups and mandate interruptions considering different levels of state segmentation in Latin America using V-Dem data. Results show that asymmetries in access to citizenship rights indeed prevent democratic breakdowns.

Highlights

The distributive conflict approach has become a popular explanation for the emergence and fall of democratic regimes based on how income inequality alters the costs of political competition to elites (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2000, 2005; Boix, 2003)
High inequality increases the costs of redistribution vis-à-vis repression, in theory making repressive regimes preferable to nonrepressive regimes
Autocracies increase the risk of expropriation by the state, prompting elites to reconsider the benefits of liberal institutions

Summary

Introduction

The distributive conflict approach has become a popular explanation for the emergence and fall of democratic regimes based on how income inequality alters the costs of political competition to elites (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2000, 2005; Boix, 2003). Authors portray the advantages of democracy for elites in securing assets from, not the poor, but the state (Albertus, 2015; Albertus & Gay, 2017; Ansell & Samuels, 2014), while others assert that distributive conflict has little impact on elites’ decision-making process during transitions (Haggard & Kaufman, 2016). The argument put forward here is that the effectiveness of citizenship rights is unevenly distributed across the socioeconomic ladder in several democracies, constituting what I conceptualize as state segmentation Because of this asymmetry in the enforcement of citizenship, the state regularly violates the rights of the poor, increasing their cost of mobilization and decreasing the costs of democracy to elites, preventing the latter from sponsoring regime reversals. I argue that uneven enforcement of citizenship rights benefits elites and helps them endorse democratic continuity in contexts of high inequality

Results

Discussion

Conclusion