Abstract

We suggest that the celebrated Impossibility Theorem of Arrowian social choice theory is after all not such a negative result since it can be interpreted as an axiomatic characterization of state-salient decision rules of a decision maker with state-dependent rankings of alternatives. We provide examples to show that there are meaningful choice functions which are not state-salient decision rules.

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