State ownership and market liberalization: Evidence from China's domestic M&A market

Abstract

We study how state ownership affects the post-merger performance of Chinese acquirers, and find that state owned acquirers (SOEs) experience a significantly larger long-term performance improvement following mergers compared to their non-state-owned (NSOE) counterparts. When partitioning the sample period into acquisitions made prior to and following China's split-share reform of 2005, we find that the post-merger performance improvement of SOE acquirers is largely attributed to the post reform period in which controlling shareholders converted their non-tradable shares into tradable status. Our results are consistent with the interpretation that state intervention in the form of capital market liberalization and alleviation of governance problems, combined with political connections and privileged access to financing, may have a positive effect on M&A performance that outweighs the inefficiency cost of state ownership in China.