State Obligation, Sovereignty, and Theories of International Law

Abstract

Much of what constitutes the business of international relations is undertaken by states in response to their perceived self‐interest, and the commitments of states create duties and obligations. This paper assesses critical values that permeate substantive understanding of state duties and obligations. It explores how states traditionally gain community standing and how their choices bind them to existing community norms, even though some are often contested. Assuming a state to be a bona‐fide and recognized member of the international community, its self‐interested activities, praise‐worthy or controversial, create obligation, i.e., a moral and legal duty recognized and actionable by law. In practice, what actually constitutes obligation may not be the same in all situations, or be fulfilled similarly by the same parties, or confer the same rights. It is difficult to establish a uniform reference with which to grapple with state obligation across all situations. This difficulty, however, does not enlighten debates on state responsibilities with regard to the binding force of international law where human rights abuses and other moral/legal violations are concerned. The argument is presented that since community membership, statehood, and state capacity provide the prima‐facie basis for state obligation, attempts by rogue states to raise and frame secondary issues of sovereignty and autonomy in order to fence‐out noncompliance are invalid States, therefore, are obligated and duty bound by community norms despite subsequent defenses that are raised in an effort to expunge transgressions.