Abstract

The safeguards verification measures of comprehensive safeguards agreement (CSA) of non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS) with the international atomic energy agency (IAEA) for verifying presence or absence of undeclared nuclear material and undeclared facilities and activities using the provisions of Additional Protocol (AP) is well recognized. Recently, the IAEA has proposed State-Level Concept (SLC) for verifying the presence or absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in the state within the provisions of the CSA. A comparison of the AP and SLC provisions has been made to explain the scope of verification under the SLC.

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