Abstract
In this paper it is argued, in the context of a Walrasian market game, that the statecontingent representation of uncertainty is not compatible with the existence of what we call systematic uncertainty, that is, uncertainty that cannot be removed whatever the decision maker's conduct and past experience. The implications of this conclusion from the point of view of the foundations of decision theory are also drawn.
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