State, civil society and natural resource rents: a theoretical outline

Abstract

This paper aims to outline the influence of natural resource rents on the state and civil society in resource-rich nations. It discusses the virtues and deficiencies of the two main theoretical approaches to the problem, the 'state capacity approach' and the 'resource curse approach', and argues that both frameworks are useful and complementary, but insufficient to fully understand the phenomenon. They are useful and complementary because they focus on the central role of state capacity while identifying a connection with the presence of relatively-abundant natural resource rents. They are insufficient, however, because they fail to explore the causes and consequences of such connection, particularly those around the relationship between state capacity and developmental outcomes. Although only preliminary elements are provided, the paper concludes, focusing on the case of the oil economy, that non-developmental configurations of the state and civil society are contingent on the reproduction of elites in power and decisively shaped by the uncontrolled and volatile flow of natural-resource rents.