Abstract
HE CENTRAL thesis of the theory of politics, as stated by Joseph Schlesinger, is that politician's behavior is a response to his office goals.' Given both the simplicity and generality of this thesis, it understandably has been a subject of considerable attention from political scientists. The major proposition deduced from it a politically ambitious individual will behave in a manner designed to improve his or her chances of satisfying that ambitionhas been the subject of several empirical studies. These studies have attempted to identify consequences of political ambitions among a variety of political actors by investigating their role perceptions and/or attitudes,2 reported behavior,3 and actual behavior.4 Another intriguing proposition deduced from this thesis, however, has been comparatively ignored, one that suggests ambition theory may also be of assistance in accounting for various institutional and regime characteristics of political systems. This proposition states that a politically ambitious individual will behave in a fashion designed to increase the prestige, prerogatives, and powers of the office or offices which he or she desires.
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