State capacity and termination of terror campaigns: a qualitative evidence from PKK

Abstract

ABSTRACT This study addresses the following puzzle: Why did the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) manage to sustain its terror campaign when Turkey increased its state capacity, yet ended its campaign of violence when Turkey’s state capacity significantly declined? The effect of counter-responses of violent groups to increases in state capacity and how those responses affect the chance of their survival, however, has not been adequately considered in studying the link between state capacity and intrastate conflict. We argue that increasing state capacity to penetrate the society and provide public services will threaten the survival of the terror group, thereby incentivizing the group to develop coercive and non-coercive strategies to secure its survival, such as coercive recruitment and fundraising, and providing public goods. We hypothesize that developing such strategies will increase the chances of survival of terror groups. Using the process tracing technique to analyse the history of the PKK’s terror campaign (1984–2013), we test these arguments and hypotheses. The qualitative evidence supports the theory, which opens avenues for future research to reconsider the role of state capacity, particularly in non-military measures, on terrorism and civil conflict by incorporating the role of counter-responses of violent groups to changes in state capacity.