Abstract

Why do states allow and even encourage extremist nonstate actors to intervene in an international conflict in violation of domestic and international law, as well as state interests? Why do states fail subsequently to rein in these actors as the counterproductive consequences of their actions become apparent? This article explores one case of such puzzling state behavior, Israel's relationship with the messianic settler movement. The movement is challenging the state, and its actions regarding the territories Israel captured in 1967 have complicated efforts to resolve the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Yet, not only have successive Israeli governments declined to enforce the authority of the state, they have pandered to the extremists. Supporting the messianic right has not offered Israel significant strategic benefits. In fact, it has backfired by intensifying the conflict with the Palestinians, weakening Israel's international standing, and undercutting state authority domestically. The article calls for supplementing a rationalist perspective that focuses on states' cost-benefit calculation with ideational factors. It proposes that the manipulation of symbols by the messianic right strengthened an ongoing process of state penetration, undermining the state's ability to utilize its power to its full extent, while increasing the messianics' influence far beyond the movement's material capabilities.

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