State and Revolution in China After Mao: Leadership, Sovereignty and the "Three Worlds"

Abstract

T HE BELGIAN Sinologist, Simon Leys was struck by a curious contradiction in his visits to China's monuments and museums after the Cultural Revolution.1 He saw evidence of physical destruction in temples and sculptures, and learned that this had been the work of the Red Guards in their attacks against old society. Yet when he visited museums or historical sites, his guides emphasized the burst of archaelogical energy which had produced important new discoveries during the same period. His guides tried to divert him from seeing the work of youthful philistines, and their denials of destruction seemed to him to indicate an embarrassing hypocrisy. It is possible, however, that the Cultural Revolution did release great creative and destructive forces simultaneously, as do most revolutions. Leys underlined the negative aspects, while his hosts wished that he see only the positive. In the months following the death of Mao Tse-tung, a somewhat similar process has been taking place. The body of the late Chairman has been laid to rest in the center of Peking, the fifth volume of his works has been published with great fanfare, and eulogies continue in the media. Government and party announcements or occasions generally contain a few words venerating the late leader and stressing the need to continue his work. Most of all, Chairman-Premier Hua Kuofeng's own position rests on legitimacy derived from Mao's at ease with you [Hua] in charge. It is further claimed that Mao rejected the destructive machinations of the so-called Gang of Four,2 and