Abstract

Subprime mortgage lending has grown rapidly and so has enactment of state anti-predatory lending laws. Our analysis suggests that anti-predatory lending laws influence subprime market dynamics and that disaggregating them into component parts is essential for understanding their market impact. Restrictions, coverage, and enforcement provisions all have significant relationships with subprime outcomes, the latter being a new finding. One finding, that broader coverage is associated with higher subprime origination likelihoods, is consistent with a reverse lemons hypothesis. There is also evidence that newer mini-HOEPA laws affect the subprime market above and beyond the older preexisting laws, particularly for subprime originations.

Full Text
Paper version not known

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call

Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.