Abstract
Building on the tools of the economic analysis of law, we will try to solve the riddle of precedents in the WTO. In the first part of the article, it will be shown how the traditional economic models used to advocate the efficiency of stare decisis do not capture its distinguishing traits. Secondly, a specific model will be developed to prove that the action of interest groups, and the intricacies characterizing the legislative process of the WTO, create incentives that are drastically different from private litigation. In this framework, in order to increase the predictability of DSB decisions, we will advocate the introduction of two incremental changes, whereas we suggest that a de jure regime of stare decisis is ill suited to achieve the peculiar goals of the WTO.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
