Abstract

This article examines Stanley Melbourne Bruce's role as Australian high commissioner in London during the approach to the Second World War and the European War from 1939 to 1941. It argues that Bruce in this period was an influential high commissioner who strongly influenced Australian foreign policy and exercised some influence, albeit with limitations, on the British government. After 1933, Bruce had transformed the office of Australian high commissioner in London from a largely commercial position into one with real diplomatic influence. In the approach to war, Bruce tended to bolster the policy of appeasement on which the Chamberlain government was already decided and in the Phoney War his cautious arguments contributed to the delay of the Allied intervention in Norway. With the accession of Winston Churchill to the prime ministership in May 1940, Bruce lost some of the influence he had had with Neville Chamberlain and he was on the losing side of the argument inside the British Cabinet about the possibility of a negotiated peace in May–June 1940. Despite the limitations of his personal relationship with Churchill, he was nonetheless an influential voice with other British ministers and senior officials and with the US ambassador in London and key members of the Roosevelt administration. This equipped him to play an effective part in the emerging Anglo-American alliance and issues of post-war international reconstruction.

Full Text
Published version (Free)

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call