Standards Harmonization and Asymmetric Compliance Technology

Abstract

Purpose - The purpose of this paper is to examine the welfare effects of standards harmonization between technologically asymmetric countries, and to determine optimal harmonization strategies for a country with mid-level technological advancement. Design/methodology - Following Salop’s circular city model (Salop, 1979), this study constructs a simple, horizontally-differentiated oligopoly model in which three firms and three countries exist. Each country adopts different compatibility standards and each firm incurs conversion costs for foreign market access due to differences in standards. The conversion costs are related to technology; standards harmonization removes these costs between participating countries. The paper considers three cases: i) no harmonization; ii) harmonization with the more technologically-advanced country and iii) harmonization with the less technologically-advanced country. Findings - The paper first considers a scenario in which all three firms occupy some share of the market in each country. It shows that standards harmonization with both the technologically more-or less-advanced country always increases consumer surplus and social welfare. In addition, the producer surplus will increase if the harmonization partner has a higher technology level, whereas it may decrease if the partner has a lower technology level. It also shows that if most domestic export goods are in sectors with conversion costs above a certain level, harmonizing standards with a technologically more-advanced country should be prioritized. Such strategies, moreover, should be emphasized when there exists a large technology gap among countries. Lastly, the paper considers another scenario, in which harmonization leads to the foreclosure of the non-member firm from the member countries’ markets. It shows that harmonization improves the social welfare of a mid-level technology country regardless of its partner’s technology. It also shows that the country should prioritize harmonization with the technologically less-advanced country. Originality/value - Though some of the existing studies consider the welfare effects of harmonization, their main assumption is that firms have the same conversion technology. Since complying with standards often requires substantial technological advancement and technical expertise, harmonization of compatibility standards between countries with gaps in technological ability carries different implications. This paper investigates the welfare effects of this harmonization and determines an optimal harmonization strategy while considering technological asymmetry among countries in standards compliance.