Standard-setting in auditing: Insights from PCAOB inspections

Abstract

We explore whether the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) consistently follows its own standard-setting policies. We do this using a methodology that combines the reports of audit partners, the timing of enacted auditing standards, and the issuance of PCAOB inspection findings. Rules governing standard-setting are critical to ensure that auditing standards are appropriate, efficient, and are therefore likely to be generally accepted. Our results suggest that in some instances auditors were penalized for omitting evidence from their working papers which is not specified in the standards, in effect, changing or removing auditor judgment in the amount and nature of audit evidence to be gathered in corroboration of management’s assertions and creating new auditing standards outside of the formal standard-setting process. Beyond the societal benefits of standard-setters adhering to their own policy-making rules, changes in auditing procedures impact the behavior of both auditors’ and managers and is costly. Although subject to limitations, we believe our results are informative to policy makers and other participants in PCAOB standard-setting.