Stalin's Ocean-Going Fleet: Soviet Naval Strategy and Shipbuilding Programmes, 1935-1953 (review)

Abstract

During the first half of the 20th century, a serious naval power was one that possessed the means to maintain or contest control of waters beyond its immediate coastline. For much of this period, the heavily armored surface capital ship was not only the symbol, but also the substantive foundation of armed force on the high seas. Up until World War II, the battleship possessed a combination of offensive and defensive strength superior to that of any other type of warship. Battleship squadrons supported by aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers, and submarines constituted a "balanced fleet." In the late 1930s, three nations — the United States, Great Britain, and Japan — possessed first-class balanced fleets. Roughly speaking, this meant a surface force of from 10 to 15 battleships, 5 or more aircraft carriers, at least 35 cruisers, and 100 to 200 destroyers. At its peak pre-1941 strength, the Soviet Navy could muster no more than three battleships, eight cruisers, and 20 destroyers, many of which were obsolete. During World War II, much of this force was sunk or badly damaged. Wartime naval construction consisted for the most part of light craft to support military operations in coastal waters. After the war, what remained of the pre-war fleet was reinforced by many new cruisers, destroyers, and submarines. The resulting force was larger and stronger than it had been before World War II, but it lacked not only modern battleships but aircraft carriers, which had displaced the battleship as the primary striking unit of a balanced fleet. The post-war Soviet navy was thus no match for that of the United States, its chief post-war rival, whose wartime building had included large numbers of battleships and aircraft carriers, as well as cruisers, destroyers, and submarines.