Abstract
One aspect of ecosystem based management is to include new stakeholders. When an environmental NGO (ENGO) gets a say in the fisheries management, this will affect the authorities’ optimal regulation. Combining a principal-agent model and a steady-state bioeconomic model we show that under symmetric information the authorities will moderate their use of regulation as a response to the ENGO’s increased influence. However, the aggregate of the authorities’ and the ENGO’s regulations will be stronger. Introducing asymmetric information, the regulation of the high cost fishers relative to the low cost fishers is weaker than under a single principal. (JEL: Q22, Q28)
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