Abstract
Employing a critical‐mass theory of collective action, this article models the emergence of cooperation among state attorneys general in litigation against the tobacco industry. These suits were not independent events, nor was cooperation based on prior agreement among the attorneys general. Rather, cooperation emerged over time as a result of interdependent decision‐making, with early lawsuits increasing the likelihood of later suits. The model emphasizes the “production function” of the collective good and the heterogeneity of the attorneys general and their political environments as keys to the development of cooperation. The model is tested against data using event history analysis.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
