Abstract
In this article, a case of partial cooperation in a game theory framework is studied. The interest is on a bi-level Stackelberg problem where one of the players is the leader and the rest are the followers, involved in a TU-game. The continuity, with respect to the leader’s choice, of the Shapley value function and the core correspondence of the TU-game is investigated.
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