Abstract
In this paper, we consider the dynamic setting of Stackelberg oligopoly TU-games in [Formula: see text]-characteristic function form. Any deviating coalition produces an output at a first period as a leader and then, outsiders simultaneously and independently play a quantity at a second period as followers. We assume that the inverse demand function is linear and that firms operate at constant but possibly distinct marginal costs. First, we show that the core of any Stackelberg oligopoly TU-game always coincides with the set of imputations. Second, we provide a necessary and sufficient condition, depending on the heterogeneity of firms’ marginal costs, under which the core is nonempty.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
