Abstract
Spectrum auction has been considered as a promising approach to effectively reallocate spectrum resources in the secondary spectrum market. In our previous work, spectrum auction in a fractional frequency reuse (FFR) cognitive cellular system was studied. However, the bidding and valuation model of secondary users (SUs) are not close to practical applications as they introduced a random value of a fixed scope. In this paper, through an optimal interference price announced by the primary user (PU), a joint precoding and power allocation algorithm via Stackelberg game (OIPPS) is proposed to improve the spectrum auction problem subject to the interference constraint of PU, the transmission power constraint of SUs, and the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) constraint of each SU in the FFR cognitive cellular system. Simulation results show the effectiveness of the proposed OIPPS algorithm in terms of the convergence of precoding and power allocation vectors and the maximized sum utility of SUs while taking full consideration of the PU’s revenue. Besides, a comparison between the bidding improved spectrum auction scheme and a traditional method is proposed to show the effectiveness of our proposed algorithm.
Highlights
With the rapid deployment of cognitive radio (CR) networks, the precious spectrum resource is becoming increasingly crowded
Through the optimal interference price of the primary user (PU), we propose a joint precoding and power allocation algorithm in a fractional frequency reuse (FFR) cognitive cellular system to balance the revenue of PU and the utility of secondary users (SUs)
We study the secondary network utility maximization problem through Stackelberg game, and the revenue of PU is taken into account simultaneously
Summary
With the rapid deployment of cognitive radio (CR) networks, the precious spectrum resource is becoming increasingly crowded. The requirement for radio spectrum has grown rapidly with the dramatic development of the mobile telecommunication industry in the last decades [1]. More effective spectrum allocation and Auction has been widely applied to spectrum allocation recently and has obtained huge achievement. The authors in [3] indicated that dynamic spectrum auction has been considered as a promising approach to effectively reallocate spectrum resources in the secondary spectrum market. A combinatorial auction with flexible bidding formats was proposed in [4] for the channel allocation problem in CR networks
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