Abstract
In this paper, we consider a problem of dynamic spectrum access in a heterogeneous network with spectrum database-assisted where spectrum operators (SOs) provide licensed spectrum and shared spectrum to secondary users (SUs) for maximizing their revenue. SUs can select a shared spectrum to transmit data with low price, but the quality of service (QoS) could be influenced by activities of primary users (PUs). SUs can also select licensed spectrum with high price for satisfactory QoS. We use the Stackelberg game to analyze the economic behavior of SUs and the optimal revenue of operators, respectively. Furthermore, we propose a price compensation scheme (PCS) to enhance the utility of SUs when PUs appear. Numerical results verify that the high activities of PUs can motivate SUs to purchase licensed spectrum and maximize revenue of spectrum operators. The proposed scheme could also enhance the utility of SUs several times than no compensation when channel condition is getting worse.
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