Abstract
In this paper, the problem of Stackelberg game-theoretic low probability of intercept (LPI) performance optimization in multistatic radar system is investigated. The goal of the proposed LPI optimization strategy is to minimize the transmitted power of each radar while satisfying a predetermined signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) requirement for target detection. Firstly, a single-leader multi-follower Stackelberg game is adopted to formulate the LPI optimization problem of multistatic radar system. In the considered game model, the hostile intercept receiver plays a role of leader, who decides the prices of power resource first through the maximization of its own utility function. The multiple radars are followers to compete with each other in a non-cooperative game according to the imposed prices from the intercept receiver subsequently. Then, the Nash equilibrium (NE) for the considered game model is derived, and the existence and uniqueness of the NE are analytically proved. Furthermore, a pricing-based distributed iterative power control algorithm is proposed. Finally, some simulation examples are provided to demonstrate that the proposed scheme has remarkable potential to enhance the LPI performance of the multistatic radar system.
Highlights
With the recent technology development of advanced passive intercept systems, it is highly important to find a solution to the problem of low probability of intercept (LPI) performance enhancement for different radar systems caused by this trend [1]
In [4], an LPI-bsaed joint transmitter selection and resource management scheme is proposed for single target tracking in radar network, where the Electronics 2019, 8, 397; doi:10.3390/electronics8040397
LPI performance criterion of radar network is minimized by optimizing the revisit interval, dwell time, transmitter selection, and transmit power while maintaining a specified target tracking accuracy
Summary
With the recent technology development of advanced passive intercept systems, it is highly important to find a solution to the problem of low probability of intercept (LPI) performance enhancement for different radar systems caused by this trend [1]. LPI performance criterion of radar network is minimized by optimizing the revisit interval, dwell time, transmitter selection, and transmit power while maintaining a specified target tracking accuracy. The problem of Stackelberg game-theoretic LPI performance optimization strategy for multistatic radar system is investigated. The LPI optimization strategy can be formulated as a problem of minimizing the radiated power of each radar for a specified target detection performance. We take the hierarchical interactions between intercept receiver and multiple radars into consideration and formulate the LPI performance optimization between them as a single-leader multiple-follower Stackelberg game. In the underlying game model, the hostile intercept receiver plays a role of leader, who decides the prices of unit power resource first through the maximization of its own utility.
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