Stackelberg-Game-Based Demand Response for Voltage Regulation in Distribution Network with High Penetration of Electric Vehicles

Abstract

With the development of the economy, electricity demand continues to increase, and the time for electricity consumption is concentrated, which leads to increasing pressure on the voltage regulation of the distribution network. For example, a large number of electric vehicles charging during a low-price period may cause the problem of under-voltage of the distribution network. On the other hand, the penetration of distributed power generation of renewable energy may cause over-voltage problems in the distribution network. This study proposes a Stackelberg game model between the distribution system operator and the load aggregator. In the Stackelberg game model, the distribution system operator affects the users’ electricity consumption time by issuing subsidies to decrease the frequency of voltage violations. As the representative of users, the load aggregator helps the users schedule the demand during the subsidized period to maximize profits. Case studies are carried out on the IEEE 33-bus power distribution system. The results show that the time of the subsidy can be optimized based on the Stackelberg game model. Both the distribution system operator and the load aggregator can obtain the optimal economic profits and then comprehensively improve the operating reliability and economy of the power distribution system.