Abstract

Two insurance companies I 1 , I 2 with reserves R 1 ( t ) , R 2 ( t ) compete for customers, such that in a suitable differential game the smaller company I 2 with R 2 ( 0 ) < R 1 ( 0 ) aims at minimizing R 1 ( t ) − R 2 ( t ) by using the premium p 2 as control and the larger I 1 at maximizing by using p 1 . Deductibles K 1 , K 2 are fixed but may be different. If K 1 > K 2 and I 2 is the leader choosing its premium first, conditions for Stackelberg equilibrium are established. For gamma-distributed rates of claim arrivals, explicit equilibrium premiums are obtained, and shown to depend on the running reserve difference. The analysis is based on the diffusion approximation to a standard Cramér-Lundberg risk process extended to allow investment in a risk-free asset.

Highlights

  • Insurance premiums are typically calculated based on the expected loss, with an added loading depending on distributional properties of the risk

  • We have considered a non-life insurance market in which two insurance companies compete for customers by choice of premium strategies

  • We focus on different deductibles, noting that alternatives would include bonus-malus systems, and proportional compensation in deductibles

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Summary

Introduction

Insurance premiums are typically calculated based on the expected loss, with an added loading depending on distributional properties of the risk (the expected value principle, variance principle, utility premium, etc.). Rather than assuming demand functions, we model the customer’s choice of where to insure directly and find closed-loop or feedback Nash and Stackelberg equilibria in the resulting continuous-time strategic stochastic differential game between insurance companies. The characteristics of an individual customer are unknown to the insurance companies, but their probability distribution known Based on this distribution, the companies can determine the expected portfolio sizes ni ( p1 , p2 ) and average claim frequencies αi ( p1 , p2 ) in their portfolios as functions of the premiums offered. The claim frequencies of individual customers are considered random to the insurance company, and we obtain explicit solutions for equilibrium premiums in the case of gamma-distributed claim frequencies.

Customer’s Problem
Portfolio Characteristics
The Strategies of the insurance Companies—Push and Pull
Gamma-Distributed Claim Frequencies
Conclusions
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