Stabilizing expectations when shifting from analytical to intuitive reasoning: The role of prediction errors in reasoning

Abstract

As humans, we rely on intuitive reasoning for most of our decisions. However, when there is a novel or atypical decision to be made, we must rely on a slower and more deliberative thought process—analytical reasoning. As we gain experience with these novel or atypical decisions, our reasoning shifts from analytical to intuitive, which parallels a reduction in the need for cognitive control. Here, we sought to confirm this claim by employing electroencephalographic (EEG) measures of cognitive control as participants performed a simple perceptual decision-making task. Specifically, we had participants categorize “blobs” into families based on their visual attributes so we could examine how their reasoning changed with learning. In a key manipulation, halfway through the experiment we introduced novel blob families to categorize, thus temporarily increasing the need for analytical reasoning (i.e., cognitive control). Congruent with past research, we focused our EEG analyses on frontal theta activity as it has been linked to cognitive control and analytical thinking. As hypothesized, we found a transition from analytical to intuitive decision-making systems with learning as indexed by a decrease in frontal theta power. Further, when the novel blobs were introduced at the midpoint of the experiment, we found that decisions about these stimuli recruited analytical reasoning as indicated by increased theta power in comparison to decisions about well-practiced stimuli. We propose our findings to reflect prediction errors to decision demands—a monitoring process that determines whether our expectations of demands are met. Shifting from analytical to intuitive reasoning thus reflects the stabilization of our expectations of decision demands, which can be violated with unexpected demands when encountering novel stimuli.