Abstract
The evolution of cooperation in a system of agents playing the iterated prisoner's dilemma (IPD) is investigated. We present results for the standard 2-person IPD as well as the more general N-person IPD (NIPD) game. In our computational model, agents have visible tags and choose whether to interact or not based upon these. We consider the evolutionary stability of the evolving populations. We extend previous work by introducing sexual reproduction (recombination) of agents and by analyzing its influence on the evolving populations. We observed the occasional formation of very stable cooperative societies, as opposed to previous results without sexual reproduction. These cooperative societies are able to resist invasions of “mimics” (defecting agents with the tag of a cooperating agent).
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