STABILITY, SPECIALIZATION AND SOCIAL RECOGNITION

Abstract

Yang's theory of economic specialization under increasing returns to scale (Yang, 2001) is a formal development of the fundamental Smith-Young theorem on the extent of the market and the social division of labor. In this theory, specialization — and thus, the social division of labor — is firmly embedded within a system of perfectly competitive markets. This leaves unresolved whether and how such development processes are possible in economies based on more primitive, non-market organizations. In this paper we introduce a general relational model of economic interaction. Within this non-market environment we discuss the emergence of economic specialization and ultimately of economic trade and a social division of labor. We base our approach on four stages in organizational development: a primordial stage of chaos; the emergence of a stable relational structure; the emergence of relational trust and subjective specialization; and, finally, the emergence of objective specialization through the social recognition of subjectively defined economic roles. In turn, this paves the way for the introduction of market institutions.