Abstract
For regular oligopolies (both homogeneous and heterogeneous) the (local) Cournot-Nash equilibria are the (non-degenerate) critical points of a Morse-Smale vector field, defined on the feasible region of non-negative prices and outputs. When at the boundary of this feasible region this vector field points inwards, it follows from the Morse inequalities that there is at least one stable equilibrium. When there is a unique, non-stable, interior equilibrium, necessarily the vector field points outwards somewhere along the boundary of the feasible region. This raises to a stable boundary equilibrium.
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