Abstract
Abstract Sovereign wealth funds (SWFs), with their massive assets, have been the subject of media attention and academic scrutiny for more than 20 years. The acquisition and exercise of power by SWFs should raise particular alarm where these are controlled by authoritarian regimes. This paper considers possible routes for SWFs to gain influence over Germany’s largest corporations, specifically the 40 members of the DAX equity index. It further examines whether any SWFs would have sufficient assets to be able to acquire blocking minorities, simple majorities, or qualified majority control to the extent possible in these 40 major corporations. The conclusion is that certain SWFs controlled by authoritarian regimes, particularly those of China and the UAE, have sufficient financial resources to enable the acquisition of significant power exercise potential through this route.
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