Sri Lanka's Competitive Tamil Network Dynamics: How to Explicate the Rise of the LTTE?

Abstract

Although much has been written on the dynamics of insurgencies and counter-insurgences, little has been said about how rivalries amongst non-state armed groups fuel intra-state conflicts. Utilizing the case of Tamil militant groups in Sri Lanka between the early 1970s and 1990, this article assesses the factors that enabled the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) to effectively outbid its numerous Tamil rivals in order to monopolize the independence struggle against the Sri Lankan state. Tracing both training and tactics of major Tamil militant groups, I argue that up until the mid-1980s rival groups were not only superiorly trained but also tactically savvier than the LTTE. Indeed, the Tigers copy-pasted many of their early tactics from competing groups and only started to dominate the struggle as a highly capable organization after it brutally annihilated and absorbed its major rivals. Thus, for a non-state armed group to be effective in a competitive theater it rather focusses on rudimentary violence against its non-state rivals instead of launching highly innovative assaults against the state.