Abstract

Sports mega-events (SMEs), such as the Olympic Games and the FIFA World Cup, have become a key part of state strategies to achieve a multitude of foreign policy goals. The literature attempting to explain this—often under the broad umbrella term of “sport diplomacy”—has recently been bolstered by the arrival of two very popular concepts in this area of research, “soft power” and “sportswashing,” leading to confusion and a general lack of consensus around the use of sport for non-sporting aims. This article makes two key contributions to the literature: first, it serves to clarify the conceptual relationship between sport diplomacy, soft power, and sportswashing. It does so by arguing that the latter two concepts are strategies at different stages of a similar process, that is, using sport to achieve specific foreign policy goals by states, state actors, and non-state actors. Our second contribution lies in the application of this conceptualization to two relevant, empirical cases of an advanced capitalist country (the United Kingdom) and an autocratic country (Qatar), both of which have hosted an SME. The results show that while a variety of states, state actors, politicians, and non-state actors use the same means (SMEs) to achieve different foreign policy goals, their geopolitics, different histories, regime types, economic systems, and levels of development influence their rationale for doing so and the strategies they choose.

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