Abstract
In a complete information auction, two integrated broadcasters bid for exclusive TV-rights to a sports league (e.g. the English Premier League), with two potential externalities: receipts feed through to the two league clubs who choose player expenditures, possibly enhancing league quality and the resulting sports channel (e.g. Sky Sports); also the right’s winner either offers the channel wholesale creating a product-differentiated retail duopoly, or forecloses. Under laissez-faire, outcomes can be “quality-driven” or “rivaldriven” depending on league/broadcaster parameters and auction protocol, and foreclosure never happens. Ofcom’s suggested wholesale regulation of Sky Sports typically reduces league rights income, quality and consumer surpluses.
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