Abstract

Traction spoofing is an important component of Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) intermediate attacks, and the traction scheme directly determines the concealment of spoofing. However, spoofing via conventional traction strategies can be easily detected using Time of Arrival (TOA) and power detection. Based on a BPSK-modulated signal, a novel traction strategy using traction code is proposed to suppress part of the authentication signal and form an ideal correlation peak. This strategy was modeled and simulated to verify its theoretical feasibility. Effective spoofing data were generated based on the signal generation software to verify the spoofing effect with the reception of the software receiver. It can be inferred that no significant distortion occurred throughout the traction process, and the value range of the traction speed was expanded. The received results in different scenarios demonstrated that the observations’ Root-Mean-Square Error (RMSE) percentage change in the proposed strategy is significantly better than those of conventional strategies. A Ratio Test was also performed, verifying that the strategy can bypass Signal Quality Monitoring (SQM) detection. Meanwhile, the proposed strategy remained effective when the C/N0 increased to 60 dBHz. In summary, the proposed strategy exhibits destructiveness, concealment, and adaptability on the battlefield.

Full Text
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