Sponsoring Private Member's Bills in Finland and Estonia: The Electoral Context of Legislative Behaviour

Abstract

This article examines the degree to which sponsored private member's bills (PMBs) in parliament can be explained by electoral incentives. Such bills are a peculiar piece of draft legislation – technically simple, topically unimportant and with negligible passage rates. Yet members of parliament (MPs) sponsor them in large numbers. One possible explanation for this behaviour is the electoral context arising out of the variance in electoral district size and electoral list types, which makes a strong personal reputation comparatively more important for some MPs. Sponsoring bills that have no realistic chance of becoming actual regulations could be a form of personal reputation-building and/or vote-seeking behaviour. Evidence is examined on the sponsoring of such bills in Finland between 2003 and 2007 and in Estonia between 1999 and 2007 in order to determine if the electoral context explains why some MPs do this more frequently. The results suggest that the electoral system does have an effect. MPs who have been elected under rules where personal reputation is not central in getting elected are less likely to sponsor such bills the larger their electoral district becomes.