Sponsored Data: On the Effect of ISP Competition on Pricing Dynamics and Content Provider Market Structures

Abstract

We analyze the effect of sponsored data when Internet service providers (ISPs) compete for subscribers and content providers (CPs) compete for a share of the bandwidth usage by customers. Our model is of a full information, leader-follower game. ISPs lead and set sponsorship prices. CPs then make the binary decision of sponsoring or not sponsoring their content on the ISPs. Lastly, based on both of these, users make a two-part decision-choose the ISP to subscribe to, and amount of data to consume from each CPs through the chosen ISP. User consumption is determined by a utility maximization framework, sponsorship decision is determined by a non-cooperative game between CPs, and ISPs set their prices to maximize their profit in response to prices set by competing ISP. We analyze the dynamics of the prices set by ISPs, the sponsorship decisions of CPs, the market structure therein, and surpluses of the ISPs, CPs, users. This is the first analysis of the effect sponsored data in the presence of ISP competition. We show that inter-ISP competition does not inhibit ISPs from extracting a significant fraction of CP surplus, leaving CPs no better off (and sometimes worse off) as compared to the scenario where data sponsoring is disallowed. Moreover, ISPs often have an incentive to significantly skew the CP marketplace in favor of the most profitable CP.