Spoiler and Enabler

Abstract

INTRODUCTIONThe topic of nuclear disarmament has made an impressive comeback since the four elder statesmen Shultz, Perry, Kissinger, and Nunn raised the issue in their 2007 op-ed piece in The Wall Street Journal.1 Embraced by its advocates as the only safeguard against the use of nuclear weapons and rejected by its opponents as a dangerous idealism, global nuclear zero has been debated thoroughly in academic and policy-making circles.As scholars and policy-makers consider the desirability and feasibility of a world without nuclear weapons, a number of them have addressed the question of what role ballistic-missile defence (BMD)2 will play in the process of nuclear disarmament? This question is highly relevant to the debate over nuclear disarmament, because ballistic missiles are the backbone of global nuclear arsenals, given their unique characteristics: they are able to deliver nuclear payloads over large distances in short time, they are a lot harder to intercept than airplanes, and, once launched, they cannot be called back. Given the centrality of missiles in nuclear deterrence, scholars and policymakers have debated the impact of missile defences on nuclear deterrence and arms dynamics since the late 1960s. The debate has been led over the technological feasibility of BMD and whether it would be compatible with limitations and reductions of offensive weaponry, or rather an incentive for countries to maintain or even increase their arsenals. Likewise, authors who have recently discussed the role of BMD in nuclear abolition have identified missile defence either as a remedy or as an obstacle.3This article takes a middle ground and adds two dimensions to the debate over the role of missile defence in nuclear abolition. First, the article broadens the focus and investigates the impact of BMD in the regional settings of the Middle East, East and South Asia, and Europe. In view of the upcoming Middle East WMD-Free Zone Conference (to take place in Helsinki in December 2012) this focus on the role of missile defence in regional settings is timely and relevant. It will be argued that the impact of BMD on the feasibility of nuclear zero at regional levels will be ambivalent. While the deployment of missile defence systems will contribute to the containment of nuclear ambitions of US allies in volatile regions, it will also add further momentum to existing arms dynamics. In Europe, BMD will most likely not materialize as a substitute for nuclear burden sharing within NATO because of intra- European disagreements over the role for missile defence and, in particular, constraints on public expenditure.Second, the article investigates options for making BMD compatible with nuclear zero at the great power level and extends the analysis to confidence building and arms control as largely neglected options.4 In this context, this article argues that BMD-cooperation will not succeed in creating trust among the great powers and will thus fail to remove missile defence as an obstacle to nuclear abolition. Given the unlikely prospect of BMD-cooperation, stepwise confidence-bunding and eventual arms control will be alternative and more viable options for aligning BMD with global zero, although movement in this direction is currently stalled.The article proceeds in three steps, starting with the analysis of mis sue defence at the regional level. It then moves on to the great-power level and traces the possibilities and limits of BMD-cooperation. Finally, it focuses on confidence building and arms control as a further option for aligning BMD with the goal of global zero.MISSILE DEFENCE ON THE REGIONAL LEVEL- ENABLER AND SPOILER'Ine feasibility of a world without nuclear weapons depends on how security dynamics develop at and between great-power and regional levels. As far as the regional level is concerned, Washington has promoted the idea that mis sue defence could improve regional stability in view of Iranian and North Korean nuclear weapons programs and aggressive rhetoric. …