Abstract
A central dynamic observed in borderline patients is the mechanism of splitting. This article critiques Otto Kernberg's notion of splitting by examining its proposed role in normal development and in the borderline disorder. Specific difficulties with the use of a valence metaphor to account for splitting are explored, as well as the relationship between clinical data and metapsychology in Kernberg's object relations theory. It is argued that inconsistencies and logical contradictions, as well as the problem of reification, make the valence metaphor untenable in Kernberg's metapsychology.
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